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By way of an Introduction:  These pages contain individual chapters from 
my 1990 book, Postmodern Sophistications. I have obtained the rights to 
the essays am making them available separately. The entire text of the 
book is also available on Research Gate.  
The underlying aim of this collection of essays was to question the 
opposition between the Sophists and Plato. That classic dispute has been 
the model for many discussions of tensions within our society:: on the one 
hand you have the clever manipulative salesmen who care nothing about 
truth. On the other hand the rigorous scientific investigation that never 
quite makes contact with politics. Rootless nihilism vs. naturally grounded 
values. Anarchy vs. Rules. 
In this book I developed a pragmatic middleground, using themes from 
Heidegger and Dewey; in later writings I rely more on Hegel. But the 
point remains the same: don't listen to the Straussians and others who try 
to force on our politics or art or philosophy a simple opposition between 
truth-loving traditionalists (Socrates) and flaky relativistic postmoderns (the 
Sophists). It was not so simple in Greece and it's not so simple today. 
Part of the book deals with postmodern critiques of rational knowledge, 
with Lyotard and Habermas on center stage. Their opposition between 
postmodern and modern views remains relevant, although post-1990 
developments in deconstruction and critical theory have widened and 
deepened the debate. The points made in these essays remain useful, if 
not complete. 
The second part of the book deals with architecture. The word 
postmodern has gone out of fashion in architecture. But the earlier use of 
the term for an attempt to bring substantive content into formal modernity 
retains important.   
My conclusions about postmodern architecture's failute to escape modern 
distance from history also remain true, as does my argument that that 
proclaimed modern distance from history is itself an illusion, that we are 
more embedded in history than the moderns wanted to think, although 
that embodiment is not as total and restrictive as we have imagined true of 
our ancestors. 
If you find any of these ideas useful, true, provocative, let me know. If you 
find them absurd or useless airy nothings, I'd still be delighted to learn 
from your reactions. 
David Kolb, January 2018
Charles A. Dana Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, Bates College
davkolb@gmail.com, www.dkolb.org, mobile 547 868 4713
This chapter criticizes Habermas as too much a modernist in his relation to 
tradition..
Chapter 6. Form and Content in Utopia
 In this chapter I discuss some reasons why Habermas insists that our common 
dialogue and joint building must be done on modern terms; then I ask if his views give an 
adequate account the place of tradition. The reading I offer is an attempt to force 
Habermas where he does not want to go. His doctrines are designed to maintain a delicate 
balance between our particular roots and our universal critical project. I argue that this 
position is unstable, and that it leans heavily towards universality and distorts our relation 
to history.
 Reflective distance from traditional ways and values allows one to use traditional 
material for one's own purposes: this is the Sophist at work, picking and choosing what 
strands of tradition to emphasize in order to achieve personal or party goals. This is also 
Habermas's ideal community at work, picking and choosing what strands of tradition to 
emphasize in order to achieve what they take to be universally justifiable goals. If the 
universality of those goals were to be questioned, then Habermas would look more like 
the Sophist. He means to look more like Plato, who tests and corrects traditional material. 
But Plato hoped to find substantive values and not just procedural rules to keep his use of 
tradition from being willful. Habermas does not mean the use of tradition to be willful, but 
perhaps that is an effect of the very formal rules and goals he suggests (cf. Bubner 1982, 
who accuses Habermas of being too close to the Sophists).
Modernity and Tradition
 Habermas does not believe in the distinction between modernity and 
postmodernity; for him the crucial distinction is between the modern and the traditional. 
What does modernity have that traditional society lacked? Habermas summarizes the 
difference as follows:
We have discussed the "closedness" of mythological world-views from two 
points of view: the insufficient differentiation among fundamental attitudes 
to the objective, social, and subjective worlds; and the lack of reflexivity in 
world-views that cannot be identified as world-views, as cultural traditions. 
Mythical world-views are not understood by members as interpretive 
systems that are attached to cultural traditions, constituted by internal 
interrelations of meaning, symbolically related to reality, and connected 
with validity claims--and thus exposed to criticism and open to revision. In 
this way we can in fact discover through the quite contrasting structures of 
"the savage mind" important presuppositions of the modern understanding of 
the world. (Habermas 1981, 52-53) 
When Habermas speaks of mythological world-views he has in mind the classic 
examples cited by anthropologists: the Nuer, the Azande, and so on. On this scale the 
Greek myths are not purely traditional; they represent an already changing system that is 
on the road to modernity. Fully modern society has learned to distinguish "the objective, 
social, and subjective worlds" and has institutionalized expert ways of dealing with these 
worlds.
 For Habermas there is a story to tell about the gradual differentiation of modern 
society. The modern spheres of science, law, and art work according to their own evolving 
rules and become independent of political or religious control. This may resemble 
Lyotard's insistence on a postmodern plurality of language games, but Habermas's 
differentiated spheres fit together into a synthetic whole which Lyotard would be the first 
to attack. Unlike Lyotard's discontinuous proliferation, the expert spheres Habermas talks 
about each have their own developmental logic that guides them as evolving systems with 
continuing identities. There is no logic to the genesis of Lyotard's language games from 
one another, nor for changes within a given game.
 In the story of modernization, the key trend is the gradual coming into focus of a 
distinction between nature (as something given) and culture (as something made). 
Primitive people, we are told, see culture a natural given and nature as something made 
by super-persons. Separating nature and culture means developing institutions that can 
distinguish and treat differently such things as ineptitude and guilt, causes and motives, 
harm and evil. This separation means seeing the difference between natural health and 
moral goodness. It means moving from a magical to a technological approach to nature, 
which brings a higher level of productive forces and more mastery of the environment.
 These developments do not proceed haphazardly; Habermas likens them to the 
maturation of an individual, and he makes connections between Kohlberg's stages of 
moral development and the changing organizational principles of historical societies. He 
sees these developments as genuine improvements in a species-wide learning process that 
helps us fulfill our needs. Modernity is an advance, not just a change. Traditional society 
tends to be static and repressive, because without distinguishing the social and the natural 
order there is no room for envisioning alternative social arrangements as something that 
people could bring about on their own (Habermas 1981, 51).
 Above all, modernity requires us to separate the world from language about the 
world. Habermas argues that as the distinctions he lists become available they allow 
people to separate their mode of talking from the world about which they talk. People 
become able to make semantic distinctions between the referent, the content, and the sign 
in linguistic acts. This enables them to conceptualize linguistic acts as linguistic rather than 
natural acts, and to distinguish connections due to the rules of meaning from connections 
due to the causal relations among objects.
 This destroys the magical function of language. But it open up the possibility of 
understanding how some statements might be valid locally just because of their 
connection with the rules of a particular language game. And other statements might be 
valid universally just because of their connection with the rules for communication in 
general. This allows us to distinguish various spheres of validity and the appropriate rules 
and type of rationality for each sphere. In working out these conditions and rules in detail 
Habermas arrives at his ethical and political conclusions.
The Three-World Story
 These distinctions establish a picture of the world that explicitly distinguishes the 
world from its pictures. We can distinguish the content of a world-view from the presumed 
order of the world it is trying to describe. We become able to talk about a world-view as a 
cultural construct with its own rules for connecting statements. The logical structure of the 
world-view is distinct from the causal patterns it reveals in the world. We can also 
separate the logical structure of the world-view from the subjective qualities of our 
experiences. Once these three elements (world, world-view, and subjective experience) 
are seen as separate, we can imagine alternatives and criticize our traditions in more 
radical ways than ever before.
 I call this overall framework "the three-world story." The three worlds are the 
"objective, social, and subjective worlds" mentioned above. There is the world of objective 
fact (linked by causal connections), the world of cultural constructions (linked by logical 
and other rule-governed connections), and the world of inner experience (linked in 
aesthetic and temporal connections, but not a realm of mental entities: cf. Habermas 
1981, 91). Each of these three worlds makes sense in reference to the others, and they 
interact to provide a framework for language and understanding. "Taken together the 
worlds form a reference system that is mutually presupposed in communication processes. 
With this reference system participants lay down what there can possibly be understanding 
about at all" (Habermas 1981, 84).
 Each of the three worlds fills a different function in our communication and action. 
It is important to see that the three worlds are completely defined by these functional 
roles. The cultural world that lies between experience and the objective world fulfills a 
certain function of structuring and unifying and guiding, and it does so for every culture, 
regardless of the particular constructs involved. Some cultures are more developed and 
differentiated, some less so, but there is a cultural world in every case, defined by its 
function rather than its content.
 The three-world story is perfectly general. Since the function of each world within 
the overall story is not tied to any particular content for that world, a modern person can 
think about the nature and function of cultural constructs without necessarily referring to 
the constructs typical of his or her own culture. Moderns can talk about world-views or 
the role of inner experience without indicating any particular view or experience.
 This generality allows modern people to criticize existing cultural constructs or 
experiences. Since we understand the differentiated roles of the three worlds, and the 
functions each world fulfills in the story, we can examine particular cultures or 
experiences to see if they fulfill their roles well. The story suggests the goal of making the 
three worlds function better together. That goal belongs to the three-world story itself 
rather than to any particular culture or world-view. In terms of this goal we can criticize 
culture and experience from a perspective that has no particular content it must hold 
sacred at the cost of its own identity.
 Thus the abstract and formal quality of the three-world story allows it to be in 
principle shared by all cultures despite their differences. This should encourage consensus-
building that will improve the functioning of the worlds of experience and culture in 
general. Of course this can only happen once people are able to make the distinctions on 
which the three-world story is based. They can share in the story once they have moved 
beyond the stage of seeing a particular tradition as "natural." Only modern people can tell 
themselves the three-world story.
 The three-world story provides a self-image for modernity. The story includes a 
history of how people developed so that they became able to tell the three-world story: 
this gives a direction to the story and helps define its goals. What it means to be a modern 
person is to live in a society that is so structured as to make the three-world story basic to 
one's identity.
We have to face the question, whether there is not a formal stock of 
universal structures of consciousness. . . . every culture must share certain 
formal properties of the modern understanding of the world, if it is at all to 
attain a certain degree of "conscious awareness." (Habermas 1981, 180)
Instead of a founding myth, moderns have the three-world story.//Footnote Like 
many myths, the three-world story murders the parents. Its picture of traditional society 
presumes too much unity and too little self-consciousness. I discuss some aspects of this 
problem in the next chapter. End Footnote// The story defines a place for modern 
individuals to stand and judge how well any tradition measures up to the ideal of smooth 
functioning expressed in the story. And because the story gives the form of modern culture 
rather than any particular content, it completes the development of self-consciousness that 
has been occurring throughout history. These features allow the three-world story to make 
normative claims that demand universal acceptance.
 Because we moderns have seen how culture and the world fit together, there is no 
turning back. We cannot again sanctify any particular cultural or experiential content. 
There is no return to traditional forms of culture, for this would mean losing the 
differentiation that gives modern persons their distinct perspective. This could only be a 
regressive step.
 As far as Habermas can see such regression is just what many postmodern thinkers 
are suggesting. When Lyotard says that grand narratives of liberation and progress have lost 
their credibility he is claiming that we can no longer believe in something like Habermas's 
three-world story with its built-in goal of perfect function and transparency among the 
three worlds. Yet Lyotard offers his own story that also involves a formal characterization 
our relation to each other and to history, this time in terms of multiple language games and 
the possibility of novelty. Like Habermas's story it provides a self-image, one closer to 
artistic than to social and scientific modernism. This story differs from Habermas's story 
because it does not invoke rational criticism, and because it does not lead to a final unity. 
Habermas stresses these differences in his critique of Lyotard, claiming they make Lyotard 
unable to properly criticize distorted and manipulative communication. Yet the results of 
both stories for our attitudes toward history may not be all that different in Lyotard and 
Habermas.
Form and Content
 Is the three-world story the only way we have left to describe our relation to 
tradition and the past? It will be worth examining the distinction of form and content in the 
three-world story as it applies to our dealings with history.
 If one defines as traditional a society with no self-consciousness at all about the 
status and nature of tradition, the roster becomes vanishingly small. Self-awareness of the 
society's relation to its traditions can emerge in many ways connected with changing 
patterns of trade, religious innovation, new agricultural technology, and so on. The 
decisive distinction between traditional and modern societies lies not in the presence but 
in the institutionalization of modes of self-reflection that may have existed in previous 
societies but were not made part of the standard modes of interaction among members of 
those societies.
Habermas accepts the general lines of Robin Horton's discussion of the difference 
between traditional and modern inquiry. Horton argues that modernity brings 
encouragement rather than repression of large-scale theoretical alternatives to received 
views and practices. But these views need to be qualified. Even in a traditional society 
with taboos on considerations of any but the received views there can be nothing that 
eliminates the possibility of self-reflection and criticism. There is no doubt that 
institutionalized theoretical reflection is a special development that vastly increases the 
amount of talk about the presuppositions of people's lives. But it is not the only locus of 
social self-knowledge. Social practices get be discussed, roles complained about, views 
wondered at. To see how a traditional society talks about itself one should not go to the 
guardians of orthodoxy whom Horton examines, but to the traders and travelers and other 
practical people who have to deal with social patterns and presuppositions in their 
everyday life. End Footnote// Those new institutions include modern political 
arrangements, and the specialized spheres of science, law, and art which were mentioned 
earlier. Each of these deals with the past in a different way, but they share an objectifying 
attitude.
From the moment when the past, which traditionally prescribed a plan of 
action to both individuals and groups, was outdistanced by the historical 
sciences, an objective world was established, open to critical scientific 
investigation. Modern man gains the freedom of an open future which, 
alone, can make him capable of transforming, according to scientific 
conceptions, the natural and the social environment. The "lack of 
historicity" of modern society, demonstrated through natural and social 
procedures, has then, the scientification of the past as an assumed premise. 
(Habermas, quoted in Portoghesi 1983)
 Habermas claims that because of modern differentiations we find ourselves no 
longer able to stand in immediate unity with the traditions we have received. We interact 
with our traditions as with tools that we have made and whose function we must improve. 
The three-world story gives us a formally defined place to stand independent of the 
content of any particular tradition, and it gives us a universal project with goals 
independent of any particular historical project.
 It may appear, though, that the goals of the three-world story are indeed those of a 
particular culture and tradition. Despite its apparent universality the three-world story 
appears to be a European story, and the cultural forms Habermas draws from the story are 
typically European. Habermas argues that this ethnocentrism is only apparent. While the 
modern structures emerged in Europe, for contingent historical reasons, taken as abstract 
structures they are not Western but universal since they concern action and 
communication in general.
 More importantly, Habermas argues that what is described abstractly in the three-
world story is not a European cultural project or form of life because it is not a full cultural 
project or form of life at all. It is a structure of distinctions, relations, rules, and values that 
must undergird any self-aware form of life. But that structure cannot be lived by itself. It 
provides necessary conditions for any modern form of life, but in order to be sufficient for 
actual life it must be supplemented by historical content.
 The three-world story suggests a life where all three worlds relate in smooth 
functional interchange. But the rules and structures required for this functioning do not 
make a blueprint for a perfect society. In his earlier works it sometimes appeared that 
Habermas was suggesting that it was possible to define a utopian society based merely on 
the conditions for perfect communication. More recently he insists that his discussions of 
the conditions of communicative action are meant to provide only the formal necessary 
conditions that make possible a modern society. They are not meant to outline sufficient 
conditions for a utopia. He defines utopian thinking as "the confusion of a highly 
developed infrastructure of possible forms of life with the concrete historical totality of a 
successful form of life" (Habermas 1981, 74).
 There is another reason why Habermas does not want the three-world story to be a 
sketch for a complete culture. While he wants to affirm the modern trends towards 
universal norms, differentiated institutions, and the creation of more flexible individual 
identities, he does not want to say that we could have a purely procedural society made 
up of what I earlier called "thin" individuals.
 In a society of such individuals, people would be characterized only by their given 
lists of preferences, and by a drive to maximize satisfactions. Institutions would be set up 
to facilitate the trades in goods services, or in rewards and punishments, that would help 
the aggregate goals. This subordinates everything about persons to the gathering of 
satisfactions, and everything about society to the efficient functioning of one kind of 
interaction. Many theorists approve this picture. Others attack it from the right and left. 
Hegel and Marx attacked such a picture (of "civil society"), and later Weber feared that 
modernity was developing in precisely this direction. Habermas's predecessors at 
Frankfurt, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, shared Weber's fear. They saw a 
"dialectic of enlightenment" whereby differentiation and rationalization paradoxically 
develop into a homogeneous society where all life is subordinated to an inhuman 
rationality of production and efficiency (cf. Horkheimer and Adorno 1969, Connerton 
1980). Those early Frankfurt thinkers would concur with some recent postmoderns in 
seeing rationalization as ultimately repressive, and in hoping for aesthetic or instinctive 
means to counter the dominance of modern rationality.
 The three-world story is meant to provide the resources to counter such pessimistic 
accounts; it allows Habermas to develop a subtle theory about different types of 
rationalization that function in the separation and in the integration of the three worlds. 
He argues that there is no fatal flaw in the process of rationalization itself, but there is a 
dynamic by which certain types of rationalization tend to dominate others due to their 
position in the current economic structure. We must favor the principles of rationalization 
and differentiation if we are to be self-critical. What we need is a more differentiated study 
of rationalization. The bad effects cited by Adorno and Horkheimer are effects of capitalist 
modes of rationalization, not a necessary consequence of rationalization in general.
 There are kinds of rational development operating in the various expert spheres of 
culture. There is also a more general rationality operating in the consensual dialogue 
found in the everyday lifeworld. This latter works to re-integrate the results achieved in 
differentiated spheres of culture back into the everyday world. These kinds of rationality 
involve our dealings with one another in communal dialogue and the exchange of 
justifications for beliefs and decisions; they are not oppressive; they liberate us from the 
shackles of traditional roles and values.
 What is oppressive about modern society is that yet another sort of rationality has 
become too dominant. Our dealings with nature have been made vastly more efficient by 
a means-end instrumental rationality that replaced traditional magical and emotional 
dealings with nature. Habermas agrees with his predecessors that in capitalist society this 
kind of rationality has come to dominate life. Impersonal mechanisms such as market 
forces and bureaucratic efficiency break into interpersonal relations where they are 
inappropriate, thus allowing one kind of rationality to dominate others that are necessary 
for the reproduction of a full human life and world. Habermas calls this the colonization 
of the interpersonal lifeworld by the impersonal systemic imperatives and their 
instrumental rationality.
 Ideally speaking, in a differentiated modern society described by the three-world 
story, the structures making society possible would be so general that they should be open 
to an immense variety of particular content. Such a society should support more different 
lives and a richer mix of goals and projects than any traditional society could ever 
achieve. Traditional society needed to stabilize definite values and ways of life in order to 
maintain its identity. Modern society finds its identity in the formal structures of the three-
world story and so it can be more accepting and flexible.
 Our society does not fulfill this ideal. What may appear as greater variety is partly 
a matter of differentiation and mostly a matter of the consumption of commodified life-
styles. The dominance of instrumental rationality is reducing our possibilities and blanking 
out rather than transforming traditional content. We are sacrificing the real richness of 
human life to the flashy surfaces of consumerist efficiency. In this Habermas is at one with 
many postmodern critiques of our contemporary world.
 I will return to the influence of system on lifeworld in the later chapters devoted to 
the problem of building livable places today. For now I want to concentrate on Habermas's 
positive alternative, and indicate its problems in dealing with the past.
 Habermas wants life to have content as well as form. The three-world story must be 
supplemented by historical material for its processes to work on. If there were no historical 
"substance" to consciousness that were not purely procedural, something very like the 
"dialectic of enlightenment" might indeed take place (Habermas 1985, 401-402)./
This is quite similar to Hegel's argument that civil society cannot do without the 
spirit of the nation to give it content and help make the transition to the rational state. 
Except that for Hegel the content provided by the historical traditions is already inherently 
rational; this rationality needs to be made evident; it does not need to be constituted by 
critical discussion. Hegel does not believe that modern citizens can or should actively 
constitute their values by reworking contingent history; the values must be already 
guaranteed by their logical place in the process of spirit's development/
 It is here, though, that the relation of formal process and particular content 
becomes problematic. Habermas says that historical material needs to be respected, yet 
the three-world story possesses goals independent of any particular historical project.
 The past influences us "from behind" as our stock of pre-interpreted unquestioned 
beliefs and values. Habermas holds that our cognitive (and other) activities all take place 
within what he calls the "lifeworld," which is a network of undoubted background beliefs 
that act as a fund of meaning and a horizon. Every explicit act presupposes the lifeworld, 
though modern cognitive endeavors do so in a particularly self-conscious way.
 Although for Habermas our belonging to the lifeworld we do is not something at 
our arbitrary disposal, it is available for communal reflection and correction. A traditional 
society would equate passing on the received background with passing on the truth, but 
what it means to be modern is to make a distinction at that point. The lifeworld supplies a 
fund of meaning, but the process of establishing the validity of propositions is 
distinguished, in modern societies, from the process of reproducing the lifeworld.
 The lifeworld is composed of linguistically structured units, but it does not form a 
structured whole that can be seen or reviewed as a totality. But any particular belief in the 
lifeworld may be raised into explicit consciousness and have its validity claims tested. 
Such criticism might lead to a new consensus based on testing the past against objective 
criteria or communally accepted values (which can themselves be tested). The lifeworld 
may thus be changed piece by piece, though not as a whole.
The lifeworld has a unity more like a collection than a system. There is no one 
theme or understanding or set of meanings which somehow protects the lifeworld from 
changes that might threaten some core identity. The lifeworld functions to make possible 
our explicit beliefs and actions, but it does not do so as a transcendental, but only as a 
necessary, condition. 
 Thus although we always act from out of a background, there is nothing in that 
tradition which is sacrosanct, nothing that cannot be questioned and revised by conscious 
mutual agreement (Habermas 1985, 82). It cannot be judged all at once, but any part of it 
is available for judgment.
 This is reminiscent of Otto Neurath's famous image of the ship. We are like ships 
under way. We cannot tear the ship down and rebuild it on the open sea, but we can 
repair or change it part by part while we travel, working on one part while relying on the 
other parts to sustain us. This crew is quite modern; they relate to their ship in a purely 
instrumental manner. The present state of the ship only imposes the requirement that the 
steps from its current condition to some envisioned future state be carefully worked out. 
Possibilities are unlimited except by scarcity of materials.
 In this image, as in Habermas's three-world story, tradition sets no goals and 
imposes no constraints. Neurath's ship has no destination; it is a philosophical Flying 
Dutchman. Any real ship is not travelling simply for the purpose of being remodeled to 
travel better. Habermas's three-world story sometimes makes it seem as if the purpose of 
living together were to purify the conditions for living together. All particular contents that 
might provide goals for living are subject to judgment and remaking in light of the formal 
goals implicit in the three-world story.
 In Hegelian terms, what Habermas has done is to allow the difference between 
universal and particular to be posited as such, but not their unity. This is just Hegel's 
diagnosis of the problems of civil society. Hegel wanted to find a rational content for life 
that helped form the conditions for consensus rather than being judged by consensus. He 
claimed that the universal process of spirit's development involved definite historical 
contents that were more than purely formal and yet were guaranteed independently of any 
particular community decisions.
 While Habermas looks to the historical lifeworlds for some solid content for living 
that is different from the purely formal structures in the three-world story, it turns out that 
the historical content serves only as material to be used in allowing the formal activity to 
continue (Habermas 1985, 401-402). Like the planking on the ship it is there to be 
remodeled. In itself the historical content sets no goals and imposes no restraints. 
Habermas cannot allow particular historical projects to set the goals of our self-criticism, 
for he fears that this would remove them from criticism. Only universal goals will do. But 
is this the only mode of self-criticism?
 Habermas is rightly concerned to avoid the unity of the universal and the particular 
that can lead (as in Hegel) to sanctifying some particular arrangements as the final rational 
structure for society. So Habermas points out how general structure and particular content 
do not form a unity (Habermas 1985, 397-399). But when the structure and the content 
remain separate, there is danger of the complete dominance of efficiency and instrumental 
calculation. Habermas tries to ward this off by refusing to allow the modern formal 
structures to be, on their own, a complete blueprint for social living. What is to prevent 
instrumental dominance of social content is the requirement that there always be some 
historical content for the formal process to work on. But this is not enough to avoid the 
dominance of instrumental rationality and the dialectic of enlightenment, because the 
historical content is present only as material to be examined and reworked.
 Habermas does invoke distinct kinds of rationalization that do not reduce to 
instrumental reason, but all his types of rationalization share the distinction of form from 
content. All content is to be judged by reflection and mutually constituted in a process 
guided by the formal goals in the three-world story. All identity is to be a made identity. 
Radical autonomy is the modern project. Historical goals and identities endure as cases of 
"believing because it is good for you."
 Habermas's problem is the purity of the overall goals given in the three-world 
story. They have to be free of historical contamination so that they can be available on all 
occasions as tools for critiquing any tradition. But do such universal tools exist?
 The difficulties with the three-world story are similar to the problems concerning 
the transcendental and empirical levels in Habermas's earlier writings: he seemed to be 
proposing conditions so transcendental that they had no critical bite. Or, if the principles 
had critical power, their own universality seemed in question. In his newer writings 
Habermas claims that the developmental logic of human growth leads to the three-world 
story and its associated norms. While not strictly universal these do give the pattern 
common to any sufficiently developed human community. In so doing they indicate that 
only certain historical contents are able to support the three-world story, so the principles 
have some critical power. But in attaining this power the story so dominates particular 
content that it raises again the spectre of the dialectic of enlightenment.
 In his description of the modern situation Habermas makes use of many 
controversial principles. In claiming that there is an overriding unity to language that 
enforces rules that are valid for any form of discourse, Habermas must distinguish relations 
of pure formal validity from relations dependent on material forces or cultural 
particularities. In analytic philosophy the attack on pure relations of validity has been 
going on since the late Wittgenstein (1963), through Quine (1969), and now again in Rorty 
(1982). In continental philosophy as well the notion of a purely formal mode of being has 
been attacked repeatedly since Heidegger, usually by analyzing or deconstructing 
candidates to show their substantive roots and their inner betrayals of their supposed 
purity. Habermas is fully aware of these attacks and mounts spirited defenses against them. 
I will not try to rehearse these debates here, but will side with the critics who contend that 
what may appear to be pure relations of validity are always supported by ongoing 
community practices that are not themselves describable in purely formal terms.
 Many postmodern thinkers endorse the general direction of Horkheimer and 
Adorno's theories about the oppressive nature of the process of rationalization. It might 
therefore seem that someone like Lyotard could give us more real historical connection 
than Habermas can allow. Certainly Lyotard vehemently denies any over-all goal such as 
the three-world story proposes, and he insists on the independence of our various cultural 
games from any universal norms. But the fact is that Lyotard's creation of new language 
games, and the irony in much postmodern art and architecture, embody virtually the same 
attitude towards historical content as we find in Habermas. Historical content is only 
material for the play of postmodern signification. This is not Habermas's rational process of 
judgment and criticism, but it maintains the same general separation of a formally 
described process from its particular historical content. What may appear a reimmersion in 
history turns out to be an celebration of our distance from history.
In a sense there is a common difficulty with both Habermas's communicative 
rationality and Lyotard's shared language games. They have no historical depth that 
requires discernment. This is most obvious in Lyotard; as in Nietzsche, everything is 
remade by the present desire and history is subdued by the will to power that revalues its 
elements now. No interpretation is required, only forceful reinterpretation. The same effect 
occurs from the fact that the lifeworld in Habermas is composed of heaped-up beliefs 
rather than intersecting practices, and its total availability to reworking.
 It is the purity and totality in Habermas's story that ought to be questioned. Can we 
separate a level of pure formal validity from the forms of life and historical development of 
practices? And even if a formal description of cultural constructs is possible, can it 
generate goals that give a critical perspective transcending all historical projects?//Footnote 
In Hegelian terms, we need to understand that the distinction of form from content may be 
made concerning our activities and creative efforts, but that it cannot be posited as such 
within them. End Footnote// If, on the other hand, we are more deeply historical, if we are 
set in many different motions by traditions, if what distinctions of form and content we can 
draw are either quite local or so universal that they provide no critical bite, then the pure 
process Habermas describes needs to be revised.
 Its totality, transparency, and formally described goals make the three-world story 
thoroughly modern. The story prescribes an activity of communal self-criticism that 
ascends above the history that gave it birth. I have been urging that this underestimates our 
immersion in history, but Habermas has a powerful retort. Only the modern project, he 
argues, can free us from historical distortions. Because in a traditional society the various 
cognitive and social domains in the three worlds are not functionally differentiated, 
mythical discussions can blend them so that relations of things and powers substitute for 
relations of reasons and argument. People are swayed by bad arguments blended with 
power relations; there is no free rational criticism and consensus. The three-world story 
provides the goal of unmasking claims where power substitutes for reasons. As far as 
Habermas can see, theorists of postmodernity are working to collapse the differentiations 
and blend argument back with rhetoric, thus opening the door to the Sophists.
 This is not to say that in the modern world all is clarity and argument. Myth is not 
the only way to befuddle the critical faculties. Modern society has its own ways to hide the 
relations of power, and Habermas's deepest intent is to unmask and criticize our present 
world. But he thinks that the principles that enable us to do so are now implicit in our 
modern projects.
 While we have good reason to worry about ideological distortions, Habermas's 
way of approaching the issue employs the same basic distinctions that I criticized in the 
earlier chapter about the Sophists. Since the three-world story demands self-transparency, 
ideological pressure can only be thought of as an outside force distorting a fundamentally 
self-active process of communication. In traditional societies there was no separation 
between the self that sought pure validity and the self constituted by social and causal 
pressures. But once modernity arrives with its formal process of rationality described in the 
three-world story, ideology can be seen as an alien force. This is because the process of 
intersubjective relations has become formal and empty. Habermas does not endorse 
modern the modern empty self, but he replaces it with the formally defined community for 
whom historical tradition can only be material. We need to rethink the categories of 
ideology and criticism to take account of our connections and impurities. We need to 
reconsider how the disciplines of craft and language might allow communal self-criticism 
without rational universality.
 My argument has been that if the universality described in the three-world story 
were really established, any rootedness in the past would be destroyed, despite 
Habermas's attempt to have it both ways. I treat the three-world story as an impossible 
attempt to rise above history. The other side of this claim would be the diagnosis that the 
three-world story itself remains particular. This might be made plausible if we could show 
that there are other ways to move away from primitive social structures. There might be 
alternatives that are neither modern nor postmodern, other routes away from myth, other 
kinds of differentiation, and perhaps other strategies than differentiation. Perhaps for these 
one would have to characterize traditional society in other ways than as "non-
differentiated." In the west such other alternatives would have been subdued by the 
Socratic story. But there may be paths that lead from myth to other kinds of self-reflection 
about tradition, ways that do not go by way of a confrontation with the Sophists and the 
establishment of universal criteria. These ways might not share all the presuppositions of 
our modern mentality. For example, the Buddhist notion of emptiness, as it expands into a 
critique of propositional truth, claims a self-awareness that is distanced from myth, but in a 
different manner than the western critiques.
 Any story about us and the past needs some distinction of form from content; to 
talk about tradition at all is already to make such a distinction. The question is whether 
that distinction must support a critical practice with its own pure goals, as Habermas 
desires. Habermas sometimes speaks as if the alternatives were either his critical practice 
or a Sophistic pragmatism. But these both share a presupposition that the self or 
community stands outside tradition using it for its own particular or universal goals. Our 
immersion in language and tradition is stronger than that, and we have no goals given 
outside of all traditions. But because of the distances and multiplicities involved in being 
"in" our past, we are not so restricted and uncritical as Habermas suggests in his modern 
picture of the premodern world.
